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1 Introduction 
The theory of precautionary saving has challenged and enriched the literature on consumers' 
behavior. Precautionary saving leads to consumption cut-backs and the accumulation of wealth 
to insure against several sorts of uncertainty or risk, the income risk being the most frequently 
stated (see, e.g., Deaton (1992), Carroll and Samwick (1998)). Lusardi (1998) emphasizes that, 
within the life cycle / permanent income model, saving and wealth are not only related to the 
first moment of income, but also to higher moments, especially to the second one (variance of 
income). 
The empirical approaches to precautionary savings have to deal with a couple of major 
challenges all of which make it hard to disentangle and identify its quantitative effects. As briefly 
reviewed in Section 2, economic theory provides a good deal of foundations and predictions for 
household behavior. 
In this paper, I will first take advantage of already used different empirical procedures to 
identify and quantify the precautionary savings motive. The SAVE data provide a variety of 
subjective measures for income uncertainty which have been used in the existing literature. As 
a next step, I adopt a new approach to map the importance of precautionary savings. I use 
short-run and long-run savings motives to describe differences in savings, saving rates and 
wealth accumulation. Even though these measures are also subjective and not quantitative 
like the ones used in Kennickell and Lusardi (2004), they can provide additional information 
explaining the heterogeneity in households' saving behavior. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I briefly reconsider the importance of 
precautionary savings and summarize different groups of the most important results along with 
problems to identify precautionary savings. In Section 3, I examine the two main variables of 
the SAVE data set concerning precautionary savings at hand: (a) the measure of subjective 
earnings variance and (b) the savings motives for precautionary savings and old-age provision 
(as an extended precautionary savings motive). Section 4 shows results for the two measures 
on wealth accumulation, while Section 5 leaves with some concluding remarks. 
I will use the SAVE 2003 data random route subsample, since thereby I can circumvent 
possible sample selection problems; see Essig (2005) for a review of the different SAVE sample 
characteristics. Like in the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), it is only the individual 
deemed most knowledgeable about the family's assets, debts, and retirement planning, who is 
asked questions on demographics, savings, housing, net worth and income of the family. 
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2 Precautionary savings: theory and empirical findings 
The life cycle (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954)-permanent income (Friedman, 1957) 
model [LCPI] has become the basic theoretical framework for analyses on saving. The theory 
has opened the door to many refinements over the years; and its importance has thus 
repeatedly been acknowledged over decades, see Meghir (2004) for an actual recognition. The 
fundamental insight of this model describes household consumption smoothed over the life 
cycle, which in turn implies that individuals spend more in earlier stages of the life and build 
up wealth in the middle part of the life cycle. The "underlying idea of the life-cycle 
hypothesis - that people save for their old age - is of course not new; nor is it Modigliani's own. 
His achievement lies primarily in the rationalization of the idea into a formal model which he 
has developed in different directions and integrated within a well-defined and established 
economic theory, and secondly in the drawing of macroeconomic implications from that model 
and in performing a number of empirical tests of these implications"1. The LCPI builds the basis 
for many empirical investigations; e.g. it has proved an ideal tool for analyses of the effects of 
different pension systems and the discussion whether an introduction of a general pension 
system leads to a decline in private saving. See Barro (1974 and 1978) and Feldstein (1974 
and 1978) for a controversial discussion on this topic. 
Figure 1 depicts the simplest form of the life cycle-permanent income model. 
One of the extensions to the LCPI is the theory of precautionary savings. It says that 
savings are not only functions as an income reallocation over the life cycle, but also as an 
insurance against income shocks. This theory implicitly presupposes some classes of utility 
functions. Leland (1968), Sandmo (1970) and Kimball (1990) showed that degree of prudence 
depends on the third derivative of the utility function (and so a quadratic utility function 
cannot represent the precautionary savings motive since the third derivative is zero). 
Figure 2 shows that savings depends on the range of the Yu and Yo. The degree of 
prudence depends of the third derivative of the utility function. If the third derivative is zero, 
the first derivative of the utility function is linear, and individuals will face no utility loss 
through income uncertainty, since E(u'(Y)) = u'(E(Y)). 
Figure 1: Income, consumer behavior, and savings during the lifespan 
                                                     
1 Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 
1985. 
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Source: Börsch-Supan and Essig (2002). 
 
Figure 2: Example for a two-period-model with a certain income Y1 and uncertain income 
Y2, which can take on the two values Yu and Yo with a probability of 0.5 
Source: Rodepeter (1999). 
 
The inability of quadratic utility functions to model the precautionary motive leads to the 
more realistic modelling by the family of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) functions.2 
The problem in assuming CRRA utility functions, which means skipping the problematic but 
convenient3 assumption of quadratic utility is that closed form solutions can no longer be 
derived; see Zeldes (1989). 
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The basic trigger for the precautionary savings motive is that insurance markets are not 
existent or imperfect. The theory of precautionary saving from literature on consumer's 
behavior predicts that in this case, risk depresses consumption and increases the accumulation 
of wealth. Alternatively, households could try to hedge themselves by a social network like 
family / friends. Wealth accumulation thus can be less important if this social network is large 
enough and can easily be accessed. This would mean that one needs to distinguish who has 
access and who doesn't. Social Security represents another source of insurances. Two incentive 
problems for privately insuring against shocks by accumulation wealth accompany the presence 
of these insurances. Firstly, social security insurances tend to maintain a relative living standard 
(since the minimum level depends on the average working income); this means that the absolute 
insurance level rises with the productivity progress, allowing a higher living standard in a 
worst-case scenario. Secondly, if social security insurances are means-tested, incentives for 
wealth holding are lowered, see Hubbard et al. (1995). 
Dreze and Modigliani (1972) have shown that consumption and portfolio decisions are not 
separable. But so far, many of the saving and portfolio choice models have been estimated 
separately. Heaton and Lucas (2000) find that business owners (taking a high income risk) have 
a lower probability to invest in stocks. In SAVE, business owners have a highly significant 
positive probability of owning stocks (probit results show marginal effects of about 14 to 15%, 
depending on specification). 
2.1 Literature review 
The literature on precautionary savings leaves us with quite mixed results. E.g. Skinner 
(1988) calculates precautionary savings up to 54% of total life cycle saving and that 
precautionary savings are higher when consumers are more risk averse and when borrowing 
constraints are more immediate, in accordance with Zeldes (1989). Other simulation results 
(Caballero (1991) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002)) studies do support these theoretical 
findings. Cagetti (2003) finds in his simulations that wealth accumulation is driven mostly by 
precautionary motives at the beginning of the life cycle, whereas savings for retirement purposes 
become significant only closer to retirement. 
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Browning and Lusardi (1996) and Kennickell and Lusardi (2004) list the main contributions 
to empirical evidence for precautionary saving; the results are rather mixed. More precisely, 
these papers can be grouped to have shown four different ranges of results: 
1. Skinner (1988) and Dynan (1993) find little or no evidence for precautionary savings. 
2. Guiso et al. (1992), Lusardi (1997, 1998 and 2000) and Arrondel (2002) report modest 
values for the accumulation of precautionary wealth using subjective risk measures. 
3. Dardanoni (1991), Hubbard et al. (1995), Kazarosian (1997), Carroll and Samwick (1997 
and 1998), Engen and Gruber (2001) and Carroll (1997), in contrast, find that 
precautionary savings produce a considerable share of wealth. E.g. Dardanoni (1991), 
using data on British households, found the average consumption across occupation 
and industry groups to be significantly lower when income variance is greater; he 
estimates that more than 60 percent of saving is due to precautionary motives. 
4. Murata (2003) and Kennickell and Lusardi (2004) provide mixed results for different 
types of households each of which associated with different risk exposure. 
2.2 Problems associated with the empirical assessment of the precautionary 
savings motive 
The meanwhile more or less basic procedure for identifying the existence and degree of the 
precautionary motive in the empirical literature is to identify the relation between household 
wealth Wh, permanent income YhP, a set of covariate control variables Xh typically 
including all sets of household variables (socio-economic variables like age, job variables and 
other characteristics) and some risk measure Rh: 
( ) ( )hhPhh RXYgWf ,,=   (1) 
As mentioned in Kennickell and Lusardi (2004), the large range of estimates are due to 
differences in the data and the methodologies used. The two most important variables to deal 
with are wealth and risk, both very difficult to assess. In the following, I quickly review the 
problems mentioned in Kennickell and Lusardi (2004) associated with the assessment of these 
variables. 
2.2.1 Wealth 
The basic question associated with wealth is: which wealth measure should be used in 
estimations? Wealth consists of different components, which differ in terms of accessibility and 
liquidity. E.g. the total wealth measure in SAVE consists of 13 different wealth items (8 
of them being financial wealth items with different liquidity). Typically, the largest share is 
 6
housing wealth, as Table 1 shows. Unconditional values confirm the typical positively skewed 
distribution: few large values, many small values, especially zeros. 
Table 1: Shares of different wealth items 
 
 Owner occ. housing Other hous. Business Financial Creditsa Other real wealth 
Unconditional    
Mean 42.89% 3.61% 1.65% 50.28% 41.85% 1.57% 
Median 26.53% 0 0 30.00% 0 0 
Std. Error 1.57% 0.47% 0.34% 1.61% 13.07% 0.32% 
Obs. 787 787 787 787 787 787 
Conditionalb    
Mean 83.56% 36.00% 32.42% 57.02% 171.53% 16.88% 
Median 91.35% 30.95% 23.70% 77.21% 26.59% 7.53% 
Std. Error 0.99% 2.60% 4.60% 1.67% 52.59% 2.87% 
Obs. 404 79 40 694 192 73 
a Total wealth was calculated gross of credits (which makes look shares larger than they are since the 
denominator is thus larger). Therefore, shares, neglecting credits, sum to 1. 
b Conditional on having positive values of that share; this means that medians are larger than 0. 
Source: SAVE 2003 Random sample. 
 
As emphasized in Kennickell and Lusardi (2004), business owners might cause problems 
for assessing the precautionary motive since their behavior differs largely from the rest of the 
sample. In SAVE 2003, they hold 23.0% of total wealth, though representing only 4.7% of the 
sample (problem: 5.3 % nonresponse to question of business wealth ownership.) There are 40 
observations for wealth if respondent is a business owner, 1109 altogether. Numbers are not 
as high as in Gentry and Hubbard (2000) where this group accounts for 42.1%; but in their 
sample, 11.4% are business owners.4 
The quintessential point here is that it might be highly misleading to neglect certain wealth 
categories and simply concentrate on liquefiable financial assets like saving accounts, since that 
procedure might neglect a much higher stock of more long-run precautionary wealth. This, 
again, recurs the question of the time horizon of precautionary savings, or, more principally, 
what exactly is precautionary savings? Against which risk should it protect / insure households? 
2.2.2 Risk measurement 
As mentioned in the introduction, precautionary savings are supposed to be some sort of re-
placement for incomplete or even non-existing insurance markets. Much of the typical long-
term risks are normally covered by compulsory insurance plans, like the insurance against the 
longevity risk (public and private pension systems / occupational pension plans, and also the 
public long term care insurance), and insurances against health risks (public and private health 
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insurances). Also many of the more short-run risks are typically insured by compulsory public 
insurances, like unemployment insurance. See Börsch-Supan (2004) for a review of the history, 
negative incentives and possible threats to the German social security system. 
So the question remains, which risks does the household need to insure against and build 
up a wealth stock to rely on. Long-run and mostly unforseen shocks are those affecting the life 
time income path (cf. Figure 1) due to job loss or wanted, undesired changes to a less-paid 
job, wealth shocks, premature death of he bread-earner, or the political risk of pensions, only 
to name some. This would change the curvature of life time income thus lowering the possible 
permanent consumption path. A second risk would be the mentioned transitory short-run 
income risk proposed by Friedman (1957). 
These reasons lead to the usage of income risk most common in the empirical literature on 
precautionary savings. 
The empirical problem, though, remains. What are good measures for income risk? This 
is typically proxied by the variance of total income. Still, there are two objections to this 
approach. (1) Caballero (1991) and Browning and Lusardi (1996) point out that the calculated 
income variation could be well-known by the respondent and hence already been insured against 
privately. (2) Measurement errors could possibly wrongly be identified as transitory income in 
panel analysis. 
To circumvent the mentioned problems, one can use subjective measures for income and 
risk. Of course, as with all subjective data, the door is open to all sorts of cognitive problems. 
Do respondents process the information given in the questionnaire well? There is now an 
extensive literature in survey research on cognitive processes that generate survey responses 
and on pitfalls that should be avoided in survey design; Sudman et al. (1996) and Tourangeau 
et al. (2000) provide overviews of the literature on survey response behavior and question design 
in cognitive and social psychology. Cognitive issues in households' reports of financial variables, 
in particular with respect to reports of household income, are discussed by Moore et al. (1999). 
The longevity and health risk are risk factors less frequently used in empirical studies, 
mostly for the reason of a lack of available data, and for the existence of the above mentioned 
social security systems. I will use two subjective variables rudimentarily covering these two risk 
factors, see Section 3.1. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
4 Same measurement: when respondents answered to owning business assets, they were classified as business owners 
even if the business ownership value is zero or below zero. 
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2.2.3 Permanent income 
Another possible challenge is the determination of the third variable entering Equation 1: 
how can the household's permanent income YhP be identified? In panel studies, this issue 
raises possible identification problems already mentioned (to differ between measurement error 
and transitory income). But in cross sectional analysis, data are not available but for one 
single income observation which requires a rather different approach. King and Dicks-Mireaux 
(1982) propose a measure of permanent income which can be calculated from cross-sectional 
data which was also used by Starr-McCluer (1996) and Kazarosian (1997)5 to measure the 
effects of health insurances on precautionary savings. Since I will use the SAVE RR 2003 
subsample only leaving me with one cross-sectional data base I will follow this approach and 
therefore quickly review the basic ideas of this measure. 
Permanent income is modelled as function of Ziγ, a vector of observable characteristics 
with γ, the associated parameter vector, and si being an unobservable variable measuring 
characteristics (skills, luckiness, power), and c(Ai) controlling for technical progress and, 
therefore, sets younger individuals better off (cohort effect). 
( )iiPermi AcsY −+= γiZ.ln  (2) 
Permanent and current income differ for two reasons: (i) the existence of an age-earnings 
profile and (ii) the transitory earnings component uit such that 
( ) iiPermiCurrenti uAAhYY +−+= .lnln  (3) 
where h represents the age-earnings profile, restricted to be constant across the population. 
Inserting 2 into 3 gives the estimation equation 
( ) ( ) iiiiCurrenti usAAhAcY ++−+−= γiZln  (4) 
Since the earnings profile and the cohort effect cannot be separately identified in this 
equation, King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982) suggest to use data from outside the sample. I will 
use the wage index development6 in Germany separately for respondents and for their partners 
in the regression, assuming that every cohort enters the labor market at age 20. With the 
parameter estimates 7 and c it would be possible to impute .ln PermiY  if it was possible to 
disentangle the error term si  to receive the individual-specific effect si. King and Dicks-
Mireaux propose the share of si+ ui of the total error term to be 0.5 after considering 
                                                     
5 This work expands this model using panel data. 
6 Alternatively, Kapteyn et al. (2004) use GDP per capita as a cohort productivity measure. 
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longitudinal studies on earnings. Therefore, the measure of of permanent income I will use 
here is the predicted value Yi from the earnings regression plus half of the difference between 
observed and imputed income. 
I use the permanent income imputation only for households which have at least one member 
not yet retired. The reason for this is that pension income, in contrast to permanent earnings, is 
determined once a person has entered retirement.7 One could have, though, used all households 
since pensions represent claims which were earned during the working life thus reflecting a 
fraction (typically about 70% of net earnings, see Braun et al. (2000)) of working life permanent 
earnings. 
The SAVE 2003 RR sample has a rather high fraction of female respondents. This might 
cause a problem if the wage earner is the husband, and thus regressing reported household 
income on a set of regressors to use the predictions from this regression as a proxy for permanent 
income should not only include the respondents' characteristics, but also the partners'. 
An alternative would be to consult an external data source, as proposed by Browning et al. 
(2003) for improving the precision of consumption question by asking a non-exhaustive list of 
consumption questions in a survey and imputing total consumption using the country's official 
consumption and expenditure survey; in this case, the German Income and Expenditure Survey 
(EVS). For expenditures, this is done in Essig (2004), Chapter 6. For income, this is due to 
further research. 
At the time being, I will content myself with the within-survey imputation of permanent 
income using the prediction of household earnings from a regression as proxy. As regressors 
I choose a set of respondent and, since I cannot separate incomes for each earner, of partner 
characteristics. This is especially important since the SAVE questionnaire does not seek 
explicitly the household head as respondent which typically is the main income earner, see last 
paragraph in Section 1. 
I include all households if either the respondent, the partner or both are fully employed. 
This is depicted in Figure 3. All variables are therefore interacted accordingly to this selection, 
e.g. partner's variables are set to zero if there is no partner. 
Figure 3: Household selection for permanent income regression 
                                                     
7 The main sources of variation of pension income is policy interventions like, e.g. the shift from gross to net earnings 
indexation, or changes in household composition (divorce or death of the partner). 
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The chance of losing observations due to missing values in one of the variables is rather 
high because of the large number of regressors. This can lead to more missing observations of 
predicted permanent income than observed earnings. Two correction steps follow: (1) I 
replace those missing predicted missings of .PermHHY  with the observed values of 
.Obs
HHY  (2) Also, 
since nothing restricts predicted income values being positive, I replace all negative predicted 
values by the observed household earnings. Regression results are listed in Table 7. I used two 
specifications, one where absolute marginal effects are modelled constantly (absolute income 
as dependent variable), and another where percentage marginal effects are modelled constantly 
(income in logarithm), which is the more common estimation procedure in the literature. The 
single elements of the fourth-order age polynomials are more or less insignificant. Still, they 
are jointly highly significant, tested separately for the respondent's and the partner's age. 
2.2.4 Further problems to deal with 
There are other sources of problems associated with the measurement of precautionary 
savings I will only briefly discuss. All the following examples are thoroughly highlighted in 
Kennickell and Lusardi (2004), so I refer to that source for further reading. The arguments are 
mentioned here to show possible problems in the following estimation procedure. 
Liquidity constraints can affect individuals differently, which may lead to different wealth 
accumulation other things being equal since households could borrow in emergency situations. 
Restrictions on the functional form can lead to difficulties if it systematically excludes 
certain groups of households. E.g. if one restricts the function f(W) in Equation 1 being 
logarithmic, this automatically excludes zero and negative wealth (indebted households). For 
transformation: see Burbidge et al. (1988) who revisited the inverse hyperbolic sine function 
proposed by Johnson (1949); MacKinnon and Magee (1990) who developed them further and 
Carroll et al. (2003) for an application of wealth data. 
Unfortunately, there exist no embedded ado-files containing the Inverse Hyperbolic sine 
function transformation ML-implementation. There seems to be a group of people working 
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on it and this implementation is "in the pipeline"8, so it can and should be used in further 
research. The transformation parameter θ from the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of 
y is 
( )
( )
θ
θθ
θ
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++
=
2
1
22 1ln
,
yy
yg  
 
( )
θ
θy1sinh −=  
(5) 
Carroll et al. (2003) estimated the parameter θ to be 3.87 in a regression using Equation (5) 
for W for SCF 1983 data. I will compare three values for θ: 1, 2 and 3.9 Figure 4 shows 
the transformed wealth values for θ: 1, 2 and 3 and also for θ = 1.05 and ln(wealth). The 
transformations for the θ = 1.05 and the ln function nearly coincide (for strictly positive wealth 
values);10 since the ln function is the preferred transformation in the literature, I will use 1.05 
for θ in all transformations. I stress here that normally, functional form restrictions are typically 
set without further mentioning. The most common values for θ, for the Box-Cox transformation 
(yθ — 1)/θ are θ = 0 and θ = 1 ,  giving the log and the linear form, respectively. Assuming 
θ = 1 ,  further restrictions imposed in wealth regressions are: lnW using only W > $4000 
(Diamond and Hausman 1984), lnW/YP using only W > $2500 (King and Dicks-Mireaux 
1982), ln[W - min(W, 0) + 1] (Starr-McCluer 1996, Carroll and Samwick 1997 and 1998); in 
the first two cases, the authors confronted the selection problem by the Heckman correction 
method. 
While there has been an extensive discussion of the importance of macro shocks in the 
estimation of Euler equations,9 this topic has been largely ignored in the estimation of 
precautionary saving. However, this problem is important in this context as well. It is not 
possible to estimate the extent of precautionary accumulation using a single cross-section of 
wealth data. The problem may be best understood by using a simple example. Suppose 
that, because of a national housing market bust, the wealth of home-owners was 
substantially reduced. Suppose further, as it is not unreasonable, that home-owners are less 
likely to face high earnings risk. Simple regressions of wealth on income risk lead to biased 
                                                     
8 10th UK Stata Users Group meetings:   Abstracts Monday, 28 June 2004.   "A comment on infrequency of purchase 
models in Stata" by Julian A. Fennema, j.a.fennema@hw.ac.uk, Centre for Economic Reform and 
Transformation, Heriot-Watt University. 
9 Using l'Hopital's rule it is easy to show that yg =→0limθ . 
10 For smaller wealth values, the difference is slightly larger; the higher the values, the smaller the gap. 
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estimates of the extent of precautionary accumulation. 
In cross sectional analyses, macro shocks may cause problems due to biases. E.g., if the stock 
market went up, and if stock owners are more likely to have risky earnings, then estimating the 
extent of precautionary wealth accumulation possibly leads to biased estimates. This argument 
also holds for portfolio choice models. 
Apart from the precautionary motive, other reasons may be and presumably are present 
which also account for a great deal of the wealth accumulation. The two most prominent 
long run motives certainly are the wealth accumulation for old age (which I argued before can 
also be viewed as a long run precautionary motive), and the bequest motive. But though a 
substantial amount of empirical evidence contradicts the predictions of the life-cycle model, 
this does not necessarily support the latter motive. Still, especially in Germany, the life-cycle 
profile of discretionary household saving is rather flat, much flatter than, e.g., in the US. The 
question emerges why saving remains positive in old age, even for most low income 
households. This is particularly puzzling given the generous pensions and health insurance in 
Germany, and still, German households do not seem to draw it down but even accumulate real 
and financial wealth. This is why Börsch-Supan et al. (2001) refer to that observation as the 
"German savings puzzle." 
Another important theoretical insight concerning factors determining savings and wealth 
accumulation are time and risk preferences11. Even if households face the same source and 
amount of risk, they might completely differently deal with it. Risk preferences can be inferred 
domain-specifically, see Weber et al. (2002). They also find that situational characteristics 
as well as person-centered characteristics jointly influence risk-taking. For precisely assessing 
preferences, a relatively large number of domain-specific risk questions is needed which normally 
prohibits the implementation of these questions in general purpose surveys. E.g. the HRS 
experimentally contained risk and preferences questions; the estimates of the coefficient of risk 
aversion, varies substantially, see Barsky et al. (1997). 
Another threat to the validity of estimates is the possible self-selection into safe jobs. Kim-
ball (1990) or Lusardi (1997) refer to this as the prudence motive12; this causes an endogeneity 
problem since people choose occupations on the basis of their degree of risk aversion. 
                                                     
11 Or risk attitudes. 
12 Kimball (1990), p.54, gives 'the name "prudence" to the sensitivity of the optimal choice of a decision variable to 
risk..[] The term is meant to suggest the propensity to prepare and forearm oneself in the face of uncertainty, in contrast to 
"risk aversion", which is how much one dislikes uncertainty and would turn away from uncertainty if possible.' And, on the 
same page, in Footnote 4: 'In different contexts, "prudence" will have different meanings. In the paradigmatic example of 
the consumption-saving decision under uncertainty, "prudence" represents the intensity of the precautionary saving 
motive.' 
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3 Household savings and measures for precautionary 
savings 
This section describes the measures used to determine the importance of precautionary 
savings. In brief, theory tells us that precautionary savings is mainly driven by income risk. 
I will compare the effects of three different sets of measures for identifying precautionary 
savings. 
The first set are respondents' expectations concerning the development of three domains 
(Germany's economic situation, the own economic situation, and the own and partner's health 
situation); more specifically, included in SAVE are also questions concerning the near future 
(job, labor income, inheritances). Additionally, I use information about the income development 
over the past five years (level and fluctuations, measured on a scale from 1 to 5). These questions 
of the SAVE questionnaire were influenced by Kotlikoff (1989) who states that new surveys 
are needed covering two issues to empirically assess precautionary savings: (1) implicit family 
insurance agreements and (2) the extent of subjective uncertainty.13 
The second set contains the job variables available for the household and construct risk 
classes. Lusardi (1997 and 1998) argues that jobs might be selected by risk preferences since 
risk averse households would have a higher probability choosing a safer job. In that case, the 
estimated coefficient would be biased downwards. A crude instrumental procedure would be to 
use regional information about unemployment rates, assuming that households do not choose 
the living region by its unemployment rate. While this assumption might be plausible for 
some countries, it is definitely problematic for Germany with its extreme east-west slants of 
employment and the still ongoing migration of younger households caused by that. Nevertheless, 
I will use this approach for comparability reasons to other papers. 
A third set of measures are the direct questions for savings motives implemented in the 
SAVE questionnaire. I will analyze what household characteristics influence these motives, and 
in a second step, I will test whether these motives are a proper way to map savings and wealth 
accumulation. 
3.1 Subjective measures 
A different approach to disentangle the influence of savings motives are subjective measures 
capturing the individual assessment of the different motives. Since empirical work is in nearly 
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no domain free from any problems, these measures also entail two types of potential problems, 
see Jürges (2001). The first one is misreporting of the motives, consciously or unconsciously. 
There might be errors in different stages of the cognitive process involved in answering to 
survey questions. Apart from having problems with allocating probabilities or importance 
weights to questions, there might also be the problem of privacy effects and social desirability, 
see Tourangeau et al. (2000) for an overview or Stocke (2001) for a study from social 
psychology. The second problem might be the endogeneity of the wealth formation processes 
and the savings motives. 
Expectations for the future which are held less concrete than income questions were also 
included in the SAVE questionnaire. They cover three domains, Germany's economic 
development (macro level income), own economic development, own and partner's health 
development. Figure 6 shows the histograms for each of the four variables. Partner's and own 
health development are nearly congruent; if health is age-dependent and the age differential 
between couples is not too large, this is also rational. Since the partner does not file for that 
question himself, a more simple explanation is that respondents simply assign the same value 
for both if the health differential is not too large. A little bit more striking is the pessimism 
concerning Germany's development compared to the own one, or putting it differently, the 
overconfidence for the own situation rating macro and micro risks differently on a larger scale. 
As mentioned in Section 1, the SAVE data contains, additionally to objective measures, 
expectation measures for different domains. Concerning earnings expectations, two questions 
are included. The first one asks for the self-reported probability14 of a net income raise in 
comparison to the previous year for the respondent and his/her partner. The second question 
asks for expectations concerning the employment situation (exactly, about how probable it is 
that respondent and/or partner will become unemployed in next year). Additionally, as a third 
variable, I use the self-assessed variable measuring the probability that respondents receive an 
inheritance in the following two years. 
Since the SAVE questionnaire measures income and savings on a household basis, the single 
probabilities for respondents and partners have to be combined to the joint probability that at 
least one of self/partner is affected: 
( ) ( ) ( )partnerrespondenthousehold XprobXprobXprob v=  
                                                                                                                                                                               
13 One of the first surveys covering a subjective probability question of earnings was the 1 989 Survey of Household Income 
and Wealth (SHIW), run every two years by the Bank of Italy. It was established in 1965. It is a series of independent 
cross sections, including a small panel component. See Guiso et al. (1992). Another data set which implemented subjective 
probability questions was the Health and Retirement Survey, (HRS). These data were used in Lusardi (1998). 
14 Probabilities were given as 10%-steps on a scale from 0 to 100%. 
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( )( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]{ }partnerrespondent XprobXprob −×−−= 111  (6) 
The variance of net income can directly be computed by the household measure (see 
Equation 6) using the corresponding values from the first two columns of Table 2 and the 
income variance expression p(1 —p)(l — α)2Y2 where α is the replacement rate in case of job loss, 
which is 67% if person has at least one child and 60% without children corresponding to the 
definition of children after the tax law (§32 EStG).15 
Table 2: Subjective probabilities for job loss, income raise, and inheritances 
 
 Joblossc Income raise Inheritance within 2 years 
 Respondent Partner Respondent Partner Respondent Partner 
Zeros 
61.0\% 
(594) 62.0\% (490) 
65.8\% 
(1438) 
66.48\% 
(936) 
89.56\% 
(1956) 
89.8\% 
(1281) 
Refusals 0.5\% (5) 1.0\% (8) 0.87\% (19) 1.3\% (19) 0.6\% (12) 0.6\% (8) 
Mean perc. 14.6 12.9 13.0 12.5 3.5 3.6 
Na 970b 782b 2165 1408 2172 1419 
a Number of reported nonmissing values. 
b If respondent or partner is not at least part-time employed and retired or unemployed, zero values will 
be imputed for further use. 
c This question is identical to the one asked in the HRS and applies only if respondent or partner is at 
least partially employed. 
The other two variables from Table 2 will be used directly as a crude proxy for some 
positive income risk, since it cannot be linked directly to current household's income. They do 
not contain information on the amount of additional permanent income (income raise) or 
wealth (inheritances), just on the probabilities. 
Table 3 contains the corresponding values from the mentioned variables measuring respon-
dents' expectations for three domains.16 
Table 3: Expectations for economic and health situation development 
 
 Economic Development Health Development 
 Germany Own Respondent Partner 
                                                     
15 Of course, this is only an approximation since these replacement rates can only be claimed for a certain time horizon 
(6-32 months depending on years of contribution payment). Replacement rates drop to 57% / 53%of a generalized net 
income after that time period Arbeitslosenhilfe. This might cause biased estimates of the motive since the variance would 
be measured too low. 
For simplification reasons and since the SAVE data set does not contain information on the age of the children, I define 
having children in the sense of the law if at least one child still lives in the same household. Also, since there are no 
information on the duration of unemployment in the data set, I settle for the Arbeitslosengeld (67% / 60%) replacement 
rates. 
16 The exact wording of that question was: "We would now like to know a little about your views on future developments. 
Please indicate, according to a scale of 1 to 10. 0 means very negative 10 means very positive. (a) The economic 
development of Germany (b) Your own financial situation (c) Your own health situation (d) The health situation of your 
partner" 
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Zeros Refusals 
Median valuea 
N 
17.7% (387) 
0.6% (13) 3 
2171 
5.0% (110) 
0.7% (15) 5 
2169 
1.8 % (39) 
0.6% (14) 7 
2170 
1.1% (15) 
1.0% (14) 7 
1413 
a Median instead of mean values are reported since values are measured on an ordinal scale. 
 
Table 4 lists values for the measures on past income development.17 These two questions 
have been asked within the drop-off part of the questionnaire. 
Table 4: Assessment of past income development 
 
 N Percent  N Percent 
significantly better 215 10.27 Fluctuate significantly 535 25.8 
slightly better 363 17.34 Fluctuate slightly 868 41.85 
about the same 731 34.91 Not fluctuate at all 671 32.35 
slightly worse 415 19.82    
significantly worse 370 17.67    
Refusals 25   45  
 
In Table 5 ordered probit results for the unemployment probabilities are shown. I included 
respondent's characteristics for partner's probabilities to check whether they might be connected 
or even dominate partner's characteristics in their explanatory power. This is obviously not 
the case. Past unemployment is highly significant, especially in the regression for partner's 
probabilities. 
There is one major problem with the reported subjective probabilities of unemployment, 
income change and inheritances, and that is the time horizon. In the first two cases 
(unemployment and income change), the time horizon is only about 6 months (since data were 
collected in June 2003, and the questions ask for changes until the end of the current year), 
while for inheritances, the time horizon is 2 years. First of all, respondents might have problems 
of adapting exactly to the time horizon given. Secondly, the short time horizon might make it 
difficult to extend the measure of uncertainty to human wealth uncertainty (see Lusardi 
(1997)). Thirdly, zero values were often given as answers to that question which might be due 
to the fact that most labor contracts are already determined for the given time period and 
respondents don't face any uncertainty for the given period. Guiso et al. (1992) propose two 
assumptions to estimate the effect of uncertainty on consumption and wealth accumulation: (1) 
the degree of persistence in the income generating process is identical for all households and 
(2) the prob-ability distribution from which earnings are drawn is time-invariant. The second 
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argument, though, might interact with the objection mentioned above that labor contracts 
might already be determined for the concerning time period, but undergo further negotiations in 
different points of time. 
3.2 Environment measures 
Apart from the subjective measures in Section 3.1, it is possible to construct a risk variable 
constructed by the job risk information contained in the job variables available in SAVE. Lusardi 
(1997) shows that saving rates are more or less independent from occupations using the 1989 
SHIW data. Table 6 shows tobit and OLS regression results for gross savings and saving 
rates18. Interestingly, having a riskier occupation like freelancers or a safer like civil servants do 
not show different savings behavior from the basic occupation category, employees. This is not 
the case for self-employed respondents, whose saving rates are significantly higher. This might 
be due to the fact of a higher polynomial degree of the income function which is not mapped 
here. I therefore also included a dummy variable for net household income larger than 10,000 
€ which turned out to be negatively significant, but it does not take away explaining power of 
the self-employed dummy. I also controlled for limited job contracts (not reported in Table 6), 
but the coefficient is totally insignificant. 
The findings of Table 6 are generally in line with results from Lusardi (1997), Skinner 
(1988), and Jappelli and Pagano (1994). 
These results suggest that a construction of risk index by occupation characteristics is little 
promising. I instead follow the procedure in Lusardi (1997) which in turn was motivated by 
Carroll (1992) and Engen and Gruber (2001) to use regional information on unemployment 
since unemployment is one of the major sources for income variation. Table 8 lists the available 
unemployment data for the 16 German states. There are two minor differences to the SAVE 
data states: (1) Berlin is, in contrast to official data, still separated in Berlin-West and Berlin-
East in SAVE. (2) Rheinland-Pfalz and Saarland are pooled in SAVE, so I used the average of 
the unemployment rates weighted by unemployed persons for these two states (which then is 
8.1%). The income variance will be constructed as in Section 3.1 (p(1 — p)(1 — α)2Y2) where p 
is the states' unemployment rate. p will be set to zero for respondents who are either civil 
servants, retired or otherwise not working (unemployed, housewife, student etc.).19 
                                                                                                                                                                               
17 The exact wording was: "Is your income situation, compared with five years ago (a) significantly better (b) slightly 
better (c) about the same (d) slightly worse (d) significantly worse?" This question was followed by: "During the last 
five years, did your income (a) Fluctuate significantly (b) Fluctuate slightly (c) Not fluctuate at all?" 
18 Gross savings were the direct savings measure given by the respondents and not corrected for net credit uptake / 
downpayments for the reason of otherwise higher data loss. 
19 The results from the subjective probabilities for p will be discussed in Section 4. 
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The implied restriction in the use of these index unemployment rates is that individuals are 
equally affected by this unemployment risk. 
3.3 Savings motives 
Another set of possible variables to explaining savings and thereby wealth accumulation 
might be preferences, not only with regard to risk exposure, but also by the curvature of the 
utility function itself. Of course, determining risk preferences and the utility function is quite 
a hard task; individual heterogeneity causes the curvature of utility functions to vary between 
people. Schunk and Betsch (2004) suggest that there exists a relationship between the mode 
in which a person usually makes a decision and the curvature of the individual utility 
function. Their results suggest that individually stable traits might help explain observed 
economic behavior, such as portfolio choice and stock market decisions. Contributions in 
economic and psychological literature have investigated the question how people resolve 
decision problems under risk and uncertainty for quite a long time. Starmer (2000) gives a 
comprehensive review of the evolvement of the different approaches of both fields and their 
raising approach; see, e.g., the emergence of the whole field of behavioral finance, especially the 
prospect theory (Kahnemann/Tversky, 1979 and 1992), and their importance highlighted again 
by Laibson and Zeckhauser (1998). 
As this discussion shows, the determination of individual utility functions is not trivial, 
though important. As a proxy for the utility function, the SAVE questionnaire also includes 
direct questions concerning the importance of a list of nine different savings motives. 
Figure 5 shows histograms for the nine different savings motives. The bimodality is less 
pronounced for the saving motives precautionary savings ("unforseen events") and old-age 
provision (especially compared to "home"). The high fraction of zeros for repaying debts 
accounts for non-indebted households which in turn rate the motive for repaying debts low. 
Saving for buying a home is very bimodal; either households are interested in buying a house 
and therefore rate this motive high or mutatis mutandis very low. 
How do respondents evaluate the savings motives and how do they compare to other 
findings? This is shown in Tables 9 -11 ,  where results are listed from ordered probit regressions 
for the nine listed savings motives. I do not comment each single regression or parameter 
estimate, since I will focus in the following on the two motives of interest in this context: the 
short run and long run precautionary savings (unforseen events and old-age provision). Only 
one comment to the regression for leaving bequests: it is obvious that the parameter estimate 
for children is highly significant reflection the accentuated bimodality of this saving motive 
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which certainly inheres in this motive's nature. 
Business owners or older households were found significant when identifying the 
precautionary motive in Kennickell and Lusardi (2004), are not likely to allocate higher values to 
the precautionary savings motive (cf. Table 9). In fact, the dummy for business owners is not 
significant but for the regression of the bequest motive. 
Kennickell and Lusardi (2004) use the 1995 and 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. 
Included in this survey is also a question for savings motives; respondents are given a list of 12 
savings motives (and additional items "no reason" and "have no money to save"), but in 
difference to SAVE, respondents should only name the most important savings reason. These 
were the "emergency", or precautionary motive (36.2%), and the old-age provision motive (32.4 
%). SAVE: even though a direct comparison is not possible, since SAVE only provides an 
ordinal measurement of the savings motives, the results are very similar: the precautionary 
motive has, on average, the highest importance (on a scale from 0 to 10), followed by the old-age 
provision motive. 
As described in Section 3.1, I will interact the savings motives with the financial decision 
maker dummy. 
4 Estimation results for precautionary savings measures 
This section presents results for each of the mentioned three groups of variables. Dependent 
variables are saving rates, savings and a relative wealth measure. In addition to disentangle 
the more 'abstract' or long-run saving goals from short ones for consumption reasons, I add 
another constructed variable to each of the regressions to control for this savings motive. In 
the SAVE questionnaire there is small set of questions included whether households seek to 
reach a definite savings goal.20 It was then asked how large the desired saved amount is and 
by when it should be reached. The control variable I constructed from these three variables is 
whether a household has a savings goal, whether it should be reached within the next two years 
and whether its value is below € 20,000 to catch all planned larger expenditures (including 
holidays, cars etc.). 
Concerning the use of the scaled variables discussed in Section 3, I circumvent the problem 
of ordinal measurement of the relevant variables by building three classes, the low one ranging 
                                                     
20 The exact wording of that question was:   "Do you or your partner currently have a fixed objective in mind for which 
you are saving at least 500 €? If yes, what it is your objective?" Nonresponse is very small (1.1%). 
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from 0 to 2, the middle one from 3 to 7 and the high one from 8 to 10.21 This procedure was not 
chosen for the probability questions in which case I interpret the percentage classes cardinally 
to calculate the household probabilities. 
I interacted the household probability for receiving inheritances within the next two years 
with the follow-up question whether this inheritance would at least slightly improve the income 
situation. This means that I will have 43 positive probabilities in the sample. In all 
specifications for wealth or financial wealth accumulation and saving rates, the expectation of 
significant inheritances is not significant. This can be linked to the discussion between Barro 
and Thaler (see Thaler 1990) whether agents rationalize and privately offset different wealth 
sources. In this case, the expectance of a windfall income like inheritances or bestowals should 
ceteris paribus reduce the wealth accumulation, which is not the case with the data at hand. 
4.1 Estimation procedure 
4.1.1 Dependent variables 
For each of the three set of explanatory variables, I check their influence on saving rates, 
which is a rather short-run measure since it is only measured at one point in time and 
represents no accumulation over time; the second dependent variable is financial wealth 
relative to permanent income, and the third one is total wealth over permanent income, both 
latter dependent variables being transformed by the inverse hyperbolic sine function with θ = 
1.05.22 For saving rates and relative financial wealth, I choose the Tobit regression model since 
only positive values are observed. Total wealth can be negative if the household is indebted. 
4.1.2 Independent variables common for all regressions 
In Tables 12 - 23, the first set of variables is unchanged for all regressions. Two things are 
worth noting. First, there is a pronounced age and income pattern. This is in line with the 
theoretical literature;23 second, past unemployment, as a further risk proxy variable, is negative 
significant in all specifications. Third, the control variable whether the household aims achieving 
a savings target also has explanatory power in all regressions. Fourth, as proxy variable for 
risk preference or tolerance, whether or not the household has a private occupational disability 
insurance, is significantly positive in most of the regressions. Fifth, occupation variables are 
only partly significant for self-employed. Civil servants, who face a significant lower occupation 
                                                     
21 This classification was chosen such that at the low and high class comprise the same amount of values. See Börsch-
Supan and Essig (2003) who used the same classification. 
22 Cf. Section 2.2.4. 
23 Keeping in mind, however, that the findings are based on cross-sectional data thereby ignoring cohort effects. 
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and income risk, do not show different financial behavior to employees. 
4.2 Subjective measures 
4.2.1 Development variables 
Tables 1 2 - 2 3  show that the macro level expectations (Germany's economic development) 
provide insignificant results for all dependent variables regressions but for saving rates where 
pessimistic beliefs lead to smaller saving rates. In contrast, the own development beliefs are 
linked to financial behavior. Optimistic respondents show higher saving rates and higher 
financial wealth accumulation, while the opposite is true for pessimistic respondents. This is 
clearly in contrast to the classical vision of any precautionary savings argument from Section 2 
as long as the causality is correctly captured here. If, in contrast, respondents belief that the 
own economic situation will be better in the future since their financial background due to wealth 
accumulation is better, then estimates are biased. In some specifications, the same is true for 
respondents' and partners' health situation expectations. If these questions are judged more 
optimistically, this gives raise to higher saving rates and higher wealth accumulation. This 
finding would support the hypothesis by Börsch-Supan and Stahl (1991) that households might 
be consumption restricted due to age-related health problems. If in contrast, households do not 
feel that these health restrictions might take place (or not that badly as primarily expected), 
wealth accumulation should be higher to provide funds for the unrestricted consumption. On 
the other hand, a high wealth accumulation could open possibilities for better health care mea-
sures leading causality in the opposite direction. Given the (still) generous German health care 
system, I discard the latter hypothesis. 
4.2.2 Income uncertainty 
The effect of income variation and development variables and their effect on the set of 
dependent variables are listed in Tables 15 - 17. These explanatory variables are partially only 
significant in the saving rates regression. Again, results are counter-intuitive. If income 
development was positive in the past five years, saving rates are higher, and also, if income was 
highly volatile and therefore more risky, saving rates are lower. If a household would face 
significant changes to its economic situation if, e.g., one or both members would finish schooling 
and start their working life, this would be comprehensible. In nearly all other cases, these 
findings would contradict the above mentioned theoretical findings. 
The variance of net income, which proved to be significant in Lusardi (1998), is insignificant 
for all three tested dependent variables. An explanation for the different findings might be that 
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in Germany, the shock on the permanent income might be lower than in the U.S., since the 
replacement rate, α, is higher in Germany. The so-called Hartz IV - reform can in this case 
been seen as a natural experiment. This also points the way ahead to reconsider this variable 
with the then available SAVE 2005 data. 
4.2.3 Job risk 
The proxy variable for job risk measure, the state unemployment rate, is significant in the 
Tobit regression for saving rates (see Table 18), but has only a very small effect. In contrast, it 
is insignificantly negative for relative financial and total wealth (Tables 19 and 20). 
4.2.4 Savings motives 
Tables 21 - 23 show Tobit and OLS estimates for saving rates, relative financial and total 
wealth. The precautionary savings motive is, in all three regressions, strongly negative 
significant if the motive is rated low; when it is highly rated, respondents do not behave 
statistically different to the median rated motive group. The old-age provision motive is 
insignificant in all regressions. Interestingly, the self-estimation of living longer than some self-
estimated average does not alter financial behavior significantly.24 
4.2.5 All variables 
Table 24 includes all discussed sets of subjective variables. The identical block of other 
variables used in previous regressions was also applied here, but is not shown in the table for 
obvious reasons. The basic patterns prove to be stable when including the additional sets of 
variables. Still, the savings motive for unforseen events is, when ranked high, now significant in 
the saving rates regression. 
5 Conclusions 
The capture of a short-run or long-run precautionary savings motive is empirically a hard 
task. I approached this challenge by three different sets of variables. 
1. Expectations for the future: A negative evaluation of the own or the economy's 
economic future situation or health situation might be the reason for households' 
increased need to insure themselves - by higher savings or capital formation - to 
mitigate a negative development. The results contradict this hypothesis. 
                                                     
24 The relative life expectancy is the following. 65.1% belief to live as long as the average, 22.4% belief to live longer 
and 12.5% to live shorter than the average. These numbers only slightly compare to surveys about self-judgement for 
driving capabilities or being a good professor (better than the average) where these numbers typically reach about 90%. 
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Households with low expectations for their own economic development have 
significantly lower saving rates, and relative financial and total wealth. 
Expectations capturing the job risk (by building a variance variable which measures 
the household's risk of unemployment) show no significant effects, while income 
development variables support the findings for economic development expectations: a 
positive development increases saving rates, while a higher volatility of past income 
reduces saving rates. 
2. Environmental situation: Substituting the expectations variable for job risk by 
local unemployment rates (which probably are not disaggregated enough) shows a 
positively significant effect for saving rates, controlling for East Germany. As for 
occupation variables, which are included in any regression specification, self-
employed have a higher saving rate. Attribution this to job risk seems difficult for 
two reasons. First, the dummy for self-employed might only produce a spline for the 
influence of income since typically self-employed have a monthly income above the 
median. Second, a dummy for retired households is also positive - the income risk 
for retirees rather lies in the development of the Social Security system. One could 
argue, though, that retirees have higher saving rates for health risks, but as seen in 
the specifications including expectations for health development, the health 
expectations dummies are insignificant while the dummy for retirees maintains 
positive significant. 
3. Savings motives: The short-run precautionary savings motive for unforseen events 
shows the expected negative coefficient if the motive is ranked unimportant, but is 
insignificant when ranked important25. The long-run precautionary motive, old-age 
provisions, is positive significant when ranked important in the saving rates 
regression, but insignificant in the other two regressions (relative financial and total 
wealth). Expectations concerning the relative life expectancy have unexpected 
coefficients or are insignificant. 
 
By using three different dependent variables, one can see that the evaluation of the 
precautionary saving motive is not homogeneous. Within one set of independent variables, the 
coefficients change when applying each set in the estimation of the three variables saving rate, 
relative financial and relative total wealth. 
                                                     
25 relative to the median group. 
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Tables 
Table 5: Ordered probit results for future unemployment probabilities 
 
 Prob. job loss respondent Prob. job loss partner 
 Coef.  P> z  Coef. P> z
Respondent   
Permanent income / 10000 -3.436 0.006 -3.551 0.052
Permanent income / 10000 sq. 2.475  0.142 3.266 0.146
Age / 10-2.1620 -2.162  0.479 -6.273 0.141
A g e  /  1 0  s q .  0.780  0.456 2.134 0.132
(Age / 10) cub. -0.121  0.423 -0.308 0.123
(Age/10)4 0.006  0.412 0.016 0.122
# inc. sources -0.043 0.314 0.017 0.744
Secondary school (D) -0.095  0.362 50.36 0.667
Graduation diploma (D) -0.208  0.166 -0.228 0.238
University degree (D) -0.076  0.608 0.004 0.984
Kids (D) 0.409 0.005 0.117 0.522
Kids living in same house (D) -0.211  0.102 -0.035 0.813
East Germany (D) 0.228  0.045 0.114 0.409
Job: blue collar (D) 0.081  0.496 0.068 0.688
Job: civil servant (D) -0.960  0.000 0.008 0.973
Job: freelancer (D) 0.254  0.408 0.550 0.190
Job: self-employed (D) -0.462  0.015 -0.050 0.822
Work parttime (D) -0.111  0.379 0.050 0.725
Work little (D) -0.479 0.010 -0.105 0.566
Female (D) 0.080  0.434 4.142 0.593
Past unemployment 1-6 months 0.287  0.009 0.171 0.189
Past unemp.> 6 months 0.047  0.705 -0.117 0.422
Partner   
# inc. sources  -0.140 0.090
Age / 10    -3.729 0.597
Age / 10 sq.    1.189 0.604
(Age / 10) cub.    -0.153 0.627
(Age/10)4    0.007 0.654
Secondary school (D)    0.047 0.773
Graduation diploma (D)    0.010 0.972
University degree (D)    0.044 0.845
Job: blue collar (D)  -0.142 0.364
Job: civil servant (D)    -1.339 0.007
Job: freelancer (D)    -0.685 0.295
Job: self-employed (D)    -0.082 0.707
Work parttime (D)    -0.192 0.776
Work little (D)  -7.053 1.000
Past unemployment 1-6 months    0.412 0.003
Past unemp.> 6 months    0.335 0.028
Number of obs 887 666
LR chi2(23)  139.4   111.12 
Prob > chi2  0 0 
Pseudo R2  0.0549   0.0585 
Log Likelihood  -1199.9729   -894.89974 
Note: The probability questions were only asked for respondents and their partners if they were fully, partly or little 
employed. 
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Table 6: Regression results for saving rates and savings on age, income and job variables 
 
  Tobit estimates   OLS estimates  
 Saving rates Savingrates  Saving rates Savingrates  
 Coeff. P >  z  Coeff. P >  z Coeff. P >  z  Coeff. P >  z  
Net HH income/10' -0.021 0.372 2756.702 0.001 -0.064 0.007 3337.686 0.000 
Net HH income/10' sq. 0.001 0.778 -290.777 0.004 0.005 0.081 -326.019 0.001 
Age/10 0.039 0.108 1580.671 0.065 0.018 0.485 789.069 0.403 
Age/10 squared -0.004 0.122 -145.323 0.079 -0.002 0.356 -81.014 0.368 
Secondary school (D) 0.028 0.078 1573.795 0.006 -0.001 0.946 955.604 0.117 
Graduation diploma (D) 0.086 0.000 2803.431 0.001 0.045 0.057 1418.290 0.106 
University degree (D) 0.090 0.000 4659.829 0.000 0.053 0.007 3908.034 0.000 
Partner (D) 0.064 0.000 2833.860 0.000 0.011 0.480 1521.987 0.009 
Kids (D) 0.010 0.634 581.270 0.432 0.018 0.379 867.396 0.264 
Kids living in same house (D) -0.044 0.015 -1335.333 0.040 -0.028 0.123 -702.688 0.304 
East Germany (D) -0.018 0.259 -1180.589 0.043 0.003 0.845 -714.526 0.256 
Female (D) -0.001 0.930 -166.434 0.744 -0.0010 0.487 -418.612 0.437 
Job: blue collar (D) 0.004 0.879 109.641 09.64 0.004 0.876 464.205 0.617 
Job: civil servant (D) 0.051 0.136 2720.648 0.023 0.006 0.847 1128.355 0.314 
Job: freelancer (D) 0.049 0.471 4336.068 0.069 0.080 0.214 6806.315 0.005 
Job: self-employed (D) 0.142 0.000 6135.093 0.000 0.172 0.000 7371.621 0.000 
Retired(D) 0.068 0.025 2415.502 0.025 0.022 0.490 1008.425 0.395 
Work parttime (D) -0.030 0.295 -1059.731 0.0310 0.295-1 0.273 1143.156 0.284 
Work little (D) -0.071 0.021 -1677.571 0.5581 0.019 0.558 1599.189 0.184 
Work not (D) -0.074 0.004 -2564.480 0.004 0.010 0.709 -87.758 0.929 
Unemployed (D) -0.067 0.022 -2168.852 0.037 0.008 0.809 138.344 0.912 
Constant -0.123 0.038 -7419.495 0.000 0.092 0.142 -1492.492 0.523 
Number of obs 1751 1751  1005 1005  
left-censored 746 746      
uncensored 1005 1005      
LR chi2 159.740 258.730      
Prob > F 0  0.000  0 .000 0.000  
Pseudo-R sq. / R sq. 0.150 0.012  0 .050 0.124  
Log likelihood -451. 995 -10940.126     
F(21, 983)     2 .480 6.600  
Adj. R sq.     0 .030 0.105  
Root MSE     0 .195 7326.500  
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Table 7: Regression results for permanent income imputation 
 
 Net income  ln(Net income) 
 Coef. P>t Coef.  P>t
Respondent
Salary index partner 4.202 0.254 -0.001  0.748
Household size 179.115 0.000 0.102  0.000
Age / 10 -77.808 0.966 1.155  0.146
Age / 10 sq. 418.941 0.366 -0.266  0.187
(Age / 10) cub. -76.241 0 . 0  0.024  0.355
(Age/10)4 3.855 0.167 -0.001  0.528
# inc. sources 77.205 0.010 0.018  0.169
Secondary school (D) 339.235 0.000 0.185  0.000
Graduation diploma (D) 264.785 0.014 0.109  0.020
University degree (D) 829.677 0.000 0.368  0.000
Kids (D) 189.060 0.054 0.068  0.111
Kids living in same house (D) -517.452 0.000 -0.205  0.000
East Germany (D) -364.048 0.000 -0.210  0.000
Job: blue collar (D) -221.743 0.048 -0.084  0.087
Job: civil servant (D) 638.495 0.000 0.214  0.002
Job: freelancer (D) 212.344 0.472 0.013  0.922
Job: self-employed (D) 530.715 0.001 0.131  0.062
Retired(D) 130.125 0.382 0.150  0.021
Work parttime (D) -405.935 0.001 -0.229  0.000
Work little (D) -558.564 0.000 -0.373  0.000
Work not (D) -602.099 0.000 -0.395  0.000
Unemployed (D) -198.885 0.103 -0.145  0.007
Widowed (D) -461.373 0.000 -0.269  0.000
Separated or divorced (D) -465.760 0.000 -0.250  0.000
Partner
Partner (D) -6457.766 0.518 -3.648  0.402
Salary index partner 1.414 0.849 0.000  0.982
# inc. sources 144.317 0.029 0.039  0.172
Age / 10 5755.009 0.335 3.805  0.143
Age / 10 sq. -1978.272 0.262 -1.316  0.087
(Age / 10) cub. 292.717 0.221 0.189  0.070
(Age/10)4 -15.188 0.197 -0.009  0.065
Secondary school (D) 141.893 0.301 0.053  0.371
Graduation diploma (D) 169.040 0.474 0.093  0.367
University degree (D) 1027.127 0.000 0.263  0.001
Job: blue collar (D) -258.862 0.074 -0.091  0.147
Job: civil servant (D) 238.089 0.371 0.067  0.563
Job: freelancer (D) -926.080 0.059 -0.283  0.187
Job: self-employed (D) 671.694 0.001 0.085  0.327
Retired(D) 521.327 0.276 0.212  0.310
Work parttime (D) -379.482 0.650 -0.043  0.906
Work little (D) -493.868 0.378 -0.521  0.033
Work not (D) -1278.834 0.002 -0.554  0.002
Unemployed (D) 663.911 0.128 0.217  0.253
Constant -1606.059 0.699 5.867  0.001
Number of obs 1694   1694  
F(33, 1100 / F( 20, 661) 22.450   31.390  
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
R squared 0.3691   0.45  
Adj. R sq. 0.3526 0.4356
Root MSE 1155.4   0.50335  
Notes: Conditional regression that at least one household member is not yet retired. In 18 cases, monthly 
income was most probably mixed up with yearly income by the respondent when respondent's occupation 
was blue collar worker with low schooling and was thus divided by 12. 
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Table 8: Unemployment information for German Bundesländer (states); average values for 
2003 
 
State                                    # Unemployed Unemployement rate Open jobs Short-time workers 
Baden- Württemberg 336,540 6.1 49,022 34,623 
Bayern 447,349 6.9 56,863 26,991 
Berlin 306,462 18.1 9,291 4,485 
Brandenburg 253,028 18.8 9,125 5,675 
Bremen 42,366 13.2 3,411 1,653 
Hamburg 86,388 9.9 7,633 2,032 
Hessen 242,059 7.9 25,989 17,651 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 181,710 20.1 7,484 2,939 
Niedersachsen 379,811 9.6 34,444 13,936 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 880,053 10.0 65,394 47,205 
Rheinland-Pfalz 154,610 7.7 27,308 9,170 
Saarland 47,718 9.5 4,953 2,495 
Sachsen 403,529 17.9 17,063 10,641 
Sachsen-Anhalt 268,293 20.5 9,795 4,613 
Schleswig-Holstein 136,159 9.7 10,771 4,740 
Thüringen 210,693 16.7 10,115 6,524 
Germany 4,376,767 10.5 354,762 195,371 
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit.
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Table 9: Ordered probit regression results for saving motives: part 1 
 
 Buying a home Unforseen events Paying off debts 
 Coef. P >  z  Coef. P >  z  Coef. P >  z
Perm. income / 10,000 3.380 0.001 2.648 0.002 1.687 0.079
(Perm. income / 10,000) sq. -4.835 0.001 -3.063 0.008 -2.206 0.100
Two income earners (D) 0.320 0.000 0.027 0.704 0.221 0.004
Age/10 -0.375 0.000 0.075 0.426 0.055 0.598
Age/10 squared 0.028 0.006 -0.007 0.454 -0.013 0.215
Secondary school (D) 0.103 0.122 0.164 0.007 0.050 0.446
Graduation diploma (D) 0.206 0.030 0.104 0.243 -0.098 0.305
University degree (D) 0.171 0.057 0.062 0.451 0.103 0.245
Kids (D) -0.091 0.309 0.027 0.745 0.063 0.480
Kids living in same house (D) 0.108 0.164 -0.070 0.323 0.078 0.300
East Germany (D) -0.457 0.000 -0.145 0.021 -0.191 0.005
Job: blue collar (D) 0.044 0.681 0.019 0.855 0.012 0.911
Job: civil servant (D) -0.113 0.457 -0.048 0.739 -0.270 0.075
Job: freelancer (D) 0.089 0 . 0  -0.076 0.762 -0.148 0.576
Job: self-employed (D) 0.055 0.725 0.007 0.965 -0.180 0.243
Work parttime (D) -0.208 0.069 -0.035 0.747 0.029 0.798
Work little (D) -0.067 0.582 -0.054 0.638 0.249 0.039
Work not (D) 0.197 0.063 0.034 0.732 0.074 0.486
Unemployed (D) -0.299 0.008 -0.127 0.224 0.107 0.327
Female (D) -0.043 0.480 0.067 0.222 -0.0430.4 0.943
Partner 0.112 0.201 0.015 0.853 -0.050 0.567
Widowed (D) 0.039 0.718 -0.157 0.118 -0.234 0.029
Separated or divorced (D) -0.032 0.748 -0.296 0.001 -0.092 0.345
Retired(D) -0.386 0.002 -0.027 0.813 -0.352 0.004
Business owner (D) -0.072 0.565 0.041 0.731 0.175 0.159
Number of obs  1957 1966  1935  
LR chi2(23)  357.94 98.41  222.1  
Prob > chi2  0.000 0.000  0.000  
Pseudo R2  0.0496 0.0118  0.0299  
Log Likelihood -3429.6856 -4121.3349 -3603.2229 
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Table 10: Ordered probit regression results for saving motives: part 2 
 
 Old-age provisions Traveling Major purchases 
 Coef. P >  z  Coef.        P P >  z  Coef. P >  z
Perm. income / 10,000 0.703 0.424 4.228 0.000 2.846 0.001
(Perm. income / 10,000) sq. -0.273 0.820 -5.310 0.000 -3.780 0.002
Two income earners (D) 0.059 0.415 0.142 0.047 -0.029 0.688
Age/10 0.295 0.002 -0.083 0.388 -0.193 0.043
Age/10 squared -0.029 0.002 -0.003 0.780 0.008 0.358
Secondary school (D) 0.185 0.003 0.185 0.002 0.186 0.002
Graduation diploma (D) 0.051 0.569 0.365 0.000 0.217 0.014
University degree (D) 0.142 0.092 0.317 0.000 0.121 0.139
Kids (D) 0.057 0.501 0.073 0.378 -0.022 0.786
Kids living in same house (D) -0.227 0.002 -0.216 0.002 -0.069 0.325
East Germany (D) -0.172 0.007 -0.153 0.016 -0.339 0.000
Job: blue collar (D) -0.071 0.488 0.195 0.051 0.060 0.547
Job: civil servant (D) -0.452 0.002 0.249 0.081 -0.052 0.710
Job: freelancer (D) -0.056 0.826 -0.079 0.751 0.058 0.812
Job: self-employed (D) 0.117 0.447 -0.121 0.416 -0.074 0.617
Work parttime (D) -0.008 0.945 0.135 0.204 0.023 0.827
Work little (D) -0.093 0.418 -0.144 0.202 0.007 0.948
Work not (D) -0.093 0.356 0.066 0.503 -0.131 0.184
Unemployed (D) -0.108 0.302 -0.354 0.001 -0.235 0.024
Female (D) -0.028 0.615 0.006 0.912 90.599 0.599
Partner 0.076 0.342 -0.138 0.081 0.179 0.024
Widowed (D) -0.177 0.081 0.091 0.364 0.142 0.157
Separated or divorced (D) -0.243 0.008 -0.138 0.1380 -0.042 0.648
Retired(D) -0.450 0.000 0.065 0.562 -0.024 0.828
Business owner (D) 0.070 0.567 -0.192 0.104 -0.041 0.726
Number of obs 1953  1967  1966  
LR chi2(23) 202.4  246.36  273.58  
Prob > chi2 0  0  0  
Pseudo R2 0.0241  0.0278  0.0308  
Log Likelihood -4094.5818 -4304.2849 -4303.7851 
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Table 11: Ordered probit regression results for saving motives: part 3 
 
 Subsidizing offspring Leaving 5 bequests To receive tax subsidies 
 Coef. P >  z Coef. P >  z Coef. P >  z
Perm. income / 10,000 2.096 0.019 0.428 0.632 3.638 0.000
(Perm. income / 10,000) sq. -1.934 0.108 0.317 0.792 -4.939 0.000
Two income earners (D) 0.160 0.029 0.090 0.228 0.181 0.015
Age/10 -0.610 0.000 -0.570 0.000 -0.235 0.026
Age/10 squared 0.049 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.005 0.596
Secondary school (D) -0.053 0.398 -0.073 0.255 0.023 0.723
Graduation diploma (D) 0.164 0.076 -0.191 0.045 -0.015 0.871
University degree (D) 0.190 0.027 -0.149 0.089 0.017 0.846
Kids (D) 1.069 0.000 0.988 0.000 0.180 0.045
Kids living in same house (D) 0.220 0.002 -0.226 0.002 -0.068 0.368
East Germany (D) -0.129 0.047 -0.255 0.000 -0.297 0.000
Job: blue collar (D) -0.074 0.482 -0.076 0.482 0.123 0.236
Job: civil servant (D) -0.065 0.666 -0.102 0.511 -0.182 0.226
Job: freelancer (D) -0.049 0.855 - 0 . 0 4  0.872 -0.402 0.143
Job: self-employed (D) -0.133 0.388 0.0410 0.999 0.041 0.787
Work parttime (D) 0.225 0.041 0.006 0.959 -0.067 0.544
Work little (D) 0.083 0.482 0.002 0.986 -0.008 0.946
Work not (D) 0.161 0.117 0.091 0.386 0.006 0.955
Unemployed (D) -0.005 0.962 30.448 0.448 -0.083 0.448
Female (D) -0.018 0.757 -0.034 0.562 -0.079 0.176
Par tner  -0.216 0.008 -0.106 0.198 -0.024 0.780
Widowed (D) -0.332 0.002 -0.304 0.006 -0.181 0.094
Separated or divorced (D) -0.310 0.001 -0.309 0.001 -0.025 0.800
Retired(D) -0.199 0.086 -0.253 0.031 -0.319 0.008
Business owner (D) 0.182 0.130 0.276 0.021 -0.037 0.760
Number of obs 1943 1943 1938 1938 1942  
LR chi2(23) 496. 77 286.4 361.09  
Prob > chi2 0   0 0  
Pseudo R2 0.0586 0.
0
0365 0.0466  
Log Likelihood -3988.61 6158 -3781.9001 -3690.9245  
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Table 12: Regression results: development expectations and saving rates 
 
  Respondent Partner  
 Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
Permanent income / 10,000 0.306 0.166
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -0.242 0.408   
Age / 10 0.050 0.071 -0.004 0.912 
Age / 10 sq. -0.005 0.071 0.001 0.890 
Secondary school (D) 0.004 0.814 0.023 0.237
Graduation diploma (D) 0.037 0.103 0.032 0.300 
University degree (D) 0.032 0.142 0.051 0.057 
Kids (D) 0.023 0.251   
Kids living in same house (D) -0.056 0.002   
Separated or divorced (D) -0.040 0.095   
Widowed (D) -0.012 0.642   
East Germany (D) -0.001 0.966   
Female (D) -0.010 0.514   
Job: blue collar (D) 0.025 0.294 0.015 0.575 
Job: civil servant (D) 0.016 0.623 -0.034 0.489 
Job: freelancer (D) 0.033 0.589 -0.017 0.833 
Job: self-employed (D) 0.114 0.002 -0.102 0.012 
Retired (D) 0.062 0.036 -0.016 0.580 
Work parttime (D) 0.009 0.735 -0.017 0.581 
Work little (D) -0.023 0.427 -0.039 0.304 
Work not (D) -0.040 0.103 -0.018 0.514 
Unemployed (D) 0.017 0.563 -0.013 0.729 
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.001 0.948 -0.0010 0.678 
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.054 0.006 0.013 0.623 
Village (D) -0.008 0.742   
Partner (D) 0.026 0.790   
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.055 0.021   
Business owner (D) 0.013 0.688
Prob(inheritance) 0.025 0.456   
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.061 0.000
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.009 0.640   
Live longer than av. (D) 0.005 0.733   
Expectations (D)  
Low: Germany's ec. situation -0.021 0.096   
High: Germany's ec. situation -0.007 0.822   
Low: Own economic situation -0.113 0.000   
High: Own economic situation 0.045 0.004   
Low: Own health situation 0.028 0.280   
High: Own health situation 0.021 0.160   
Low: Partner's health situation -0.021 0.555   
High: Partner's health situation -0.020 0.261   
Constant -0.163 0.038   
Number of obs  1573
uncensored obs  909   
LR chi2(68)  317.46   
Prob > chi2  0
Pseudo R2  0.4074   
Log likelihood  -230.92823   
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Table 13: Regression results: development expectations and financial wealth/permanent 
income 
 
 Respondent  Partner  
 Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
Permanent income / 10,000 11.826 0.000
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -11.645 0.000   
Age / 10 0.560 0.039 0.590 0.127 
Age / 10 sq. -0.035 0.164 -0.0350.1 0.185 
Secondary school (D) 0.326 0.049 -0.352 0.096 
Graduation diploma (D) 0.255 0.290 -0.112 0.738 
University degree (D) 0.151 0.501 -0.048 0.871 
Kids (D) 0.140 0.494   
Kids living in same house (D) -0.602 0.001   
Separated or divorced (D) -0.340 0.144   
Widowed (D) -0.245 0.358   
East Germany (D) -0.319 0.047   
Female (D) -0.233 0.114   
Job: blue collar (D) 0.020 0.937 -0.168 0.572 
Job: civil servant (D) -0.425 0.246 -0.156 0.758 
Job: freelancer (D) -0.562 0.383 -0.760 0.360 
Job: self-employed (D) -0.589 0.133 -0.605 0.144 
Retired (D) 0.163 0.565 -0.016 0.955 
Work parttime (D) -0.326 0 . 0  0.021 0.951 
Work little (D) -0.393 0.193 0.099 0.804 
Work not (D) -0.444 0.083 -0.041 0.887 
Unemployed (D) -0.195 0.498 0.284 0.444 
Unemp.> 1 month (D) 0.188 0.311 -0.058 0.828 
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.581 0.005 -0.082 0.780 
Village (D) 0.044 0.865   
Partner (D) -1.637 0.096   
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.611 0.016   
Business owner (D) 0.862 0.008
Prob(inheritance) 0.705 0.053   
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.376 0.043   
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.054 0.778   
Live longer than av. (D) -0.037 0.806   
Expectations (D)  
Low: Germany's ec. situation 0.112 0.389   
High: Germany's ec. situation -0.217 0.583   
Low: Own economic situation -0.839 0.000   
High: Own economic situation 0.238 0.142   
Low: Own health situation -0.528 0.034   
High: Own health situation -0.194 0.212   
Low: Partner's health situation -0.172 0.609   
High: Partner's health situation 0.173 0.362   
Constant -1.721 0.029
Number of obs 1140
uncensored obs 431    
LR chi2(68) 402.4    
Prob > chi2 0
Pseudo R2 0.1034    
Log likelihood -1744.6798    
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Table 14: Regression results: development expectations and total wealth/permanent 
income 
 
  Respondent  Partner  
 Coef.  P>t Coef. P>t 
Permanent income / 10,000 12.520 0.000
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -12.950  0.000   
Age / 10 0.872  0.003 1.025 0.015 
Age / 10 sq. -0.050  0.065 -0.068 0.108 
Secondary school (D) 0.573  0.002 -0.129 0.592 
Graduation diploma (D) 0.472  0.071 -0.472 0.215 
University degree (D) 0.571  0.029 -0.075 0.826 
Kids (D) -0.574  0.010   
Kids living in same house (D) 0.053  0.791   
Separated or divorced (D) -0.424  0.100   
Widowed (D) -0.313  0.275   
East Germany (D) -0.428  0.015   
Female (D) -0.340  0.037   
Job: blue collar (D) 0.313  0.269 -0.449 0.179 
Job: civil servant (D) 0.026  0.952 0.316 0.596 
Job: freelancer (D) -0.993  0.156 -0.353 0.712 
Job: self-employed (D) -0.185  0.707 0.391 0.451 
Retired (D) -0.345  0.270 -0.382 0.252 
Work parttime (D) 0.297  0.394 0.302 0.448 
Work little (D) 0.679  0.041 -0.245 0.589 
Work not (D) 0.555  0.048 0.512 0.122 
Unemployed (D) -0.813  0.006 -0.123 0.763 
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.048  0.817 -0.324 0.290 
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.386  0.089 0.350 0.287 
Village (D) 1.157  0.000   
Partner (D) -3.496  0.001   
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.713  0.011   
Business owner (D) 1.959 0.000
Prob(inheritance) 0.472  0.256   
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.179  0.399   
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.215  0.307   
Live longer than av. (D) -0.367  0.028   
Expectations (D)  
Low: Germany's ec. situation 0.216  0.134   
High: Germany's ec. situation -0.693  0.112   
Low: Own economic situation -0.611  0.002   
High: Own economic situation 0.427  0.019   
Low: Own health situation -0.422  0.109   
High: Own health situation 0.128  0.458   
Low: Partner's health situation -0.488  0.183   
High: Partner's health situation 0.100  0.644   
Constant -1.754 0.037
Number of obs  1016
F( 56, 959)  10.36    
Prob i F  0    
R-squared  0.3769    
Adj R-squared  0.3405    
Root MSE  2.0339    
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Table 15: Regression results: probability of job loss expectations and saving rates 
 
  Respondent  Partner  
 Coef.  P>t Coef. P>t 
Permanent income / 10,000 0.476 0.033
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -0.402  0.174   
Age / 10 0.043  0.128 0.000 0.993 
Age / 10 sq. -0.004  0.120 0.000 0.974 
Secondary school (D) 0.012  0.448 0 . 2  0.252 
Graduation diploma (D) 0.048  0.034 0.029 0.356 
University degree (D) 0.042  0.049 0.052 0.052 
Kids (D) 0.021  0.305   
Kids living in same house (D) -0.055  0.002   
Separated or divorced (D) -0.045  0.057   
Widowed (D) -0.015  0.578   
East Germany (D) -0.013  0.422   
Female (D) -0.011  0.454   
Job: blue collar (D) 0.040  0.096 0.014 0.589 
Job: civil servant (D) 0.003  0.936 -0.043 0.389 
Job: freelancer (D) 0.049  0.425 -0.063 0.463 
Job: self-employed (D) 0.125  0.001 -0.107 0.010 
Retired (D) 0.069  0.018 -0.024 0.408 
Work parttime (D) 0.000  0.994 -0.022 0.478 
Work little (D) -0.011  0.712 -0.039 0.308 
Work not (D) -0.028  0.253 -0.009 0.746 
Unemployed (D) 0.003  0.915 -0.034 0.358 
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.002  0.895 -0.004 0.851 
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.054  0.006 0.014 0.605 
Village (D) -0.002  0.938   
Partner (D) 0.002  0.987   
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.055  0.024   
Business owner (D) 0.018  0.575   
Prob(inheritance) 0.035  0.296   
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.063  0.000   
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.009  0.605   
Live longer than av. (D) 0.008  0.586   
Income variation      
Income development: pos. (D) 0.039  0.006   
Inc. dev.: highly volatile (D) -0.039  0.025   
Inc. dev.: slightly volatile (D) -0.009  0.529   
Variance of net income 0.000  0.271   
Constant -0.179  0.023   
Number of obs  1566    
uncensored obs  906    
LR chi2(68)  267.7    
Prob > chi2  0    
Pseudo R2  0.3462    
Log likelihood  -252.73504    
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Table 16: Regression results: probability of job loss expectations and financial 
wealth/permanent income 
 
 Respondent  Partner  
 Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
Permanent income / 10,000 12.975 0.000   
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -12.601 0.000   
Age / 10 0.613 0.025 0.632 0.101 
Age / 10 sq. -0.041 0.107 -0.058 0.125 
Secondary school (D) 0.406 0.015 -0.318 0.136 
Graduation diploma (D) 0.272 0.265 -0.225 0.514 
University degree (D) 0.148 0.517 0.042 0.886 
Kids (D) 0.159 0.440   
Kids living in same house (D) -0.707 0.000   
Separated or divorced (D) -0.274 0.243   
Widowed (D) -0.243 0.369   
East Germany (D) -0.352 0.030   
Female (D) -0.284 0.058   
Job: blue collar (D) 0.072 0.779 -0.183 0.545 
Job: civil servant (D) -0.430 0.245 -0.253 0.622 
Job: freelancer (D) -0.485 0.458 -0.880 0.293 
Job: self-employed (D) -0.551 0.168 -0.649 0.129 
Retired (D) 0.214 0.453 -0.113 0.696 
Work parttime (D) -0.293 0.355 0.041 0.906 
Work little (D) -0.317 0.299 -0.040 0.921 
Work not (D) -0.355 0.175 -0.007 0.981 
Unemployed (D) -0.337 0.250 0.132 0.725 
Unemp.> 1 month (D) 0.153 0.416 -0.102 0.707 
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.584 0.005 -0.054 0.855 
Village (D) 0.072 0.784   
Partner (D) -1.544 0.110   
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.581 0.025   
Business owner (D) 0.899 0.007   
Prob(inheritance) 0.756 0.040   
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.375 0.047   
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.121 0.524   
Live longer than av. (D) -0.054 0.722   
Income variation  
Income development: pos. (D) 0.151 0.329   
Inc. dev.: highly volatile (D) -0.194 0.276   
Inc. dev.: slightly volatile (D) -0.014 0.923   
Variance of net income -0.001 0.311   
Constant -2.158 0.007   
Number of obs 1130
uncensored obs 706    
LR chi2(68) 360.65    
Prob > chi2 0    
Pseudo R2 0.0934    
Log likelihood -1749.5148    
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Table 17: Regression results: probability of job loss expectations and total 
wealth/permanent income 
 
 Respondent  Partner  
 Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
Permanent income / 10,000 15.123 0.000   
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -15.517 0.000   
Age / 10 0.877 0.003 1.169 0.005 
Age / 10 sq. -0.053 0.053 -0.084 0.044 
Secondary school (D) 0.657 0.000 -0.146 0.544 
Graduation diploma (D) 0.641 0.014 -0.847 0.030 
University degree (D) 0.645 0.014 -0.120 0.726 
Kids (D) -0.566 0.011   
Kids living in same house (D) -0.046 0.819   
Separated or divorced (D) -0.513 0.047   
Widowed (D) -0.430 0.139   
East Germany (D) -0.444 0.012   
Female (D) -0.451 0.006   
Job: blue collar (D) 0.311 0.279 -0.541 0.109 
Job: civil servant (D) -0.033 0.938 0.331 0.581 
Job: freelancer (D) -1.033 0.142 40.674 0.674 
Job: self-employed (D) -0.340 0.493 0.637 0.232 
Retired (D) -0.458 0.144 -0.425 0.203 
Work parttime (D) 0.352 0.315 0.249 0.529 
Work little (D) 0.772 0.022 -0.438 0.347 
Work not (D) 0.649 0.022 0.550 0.098 
Unemployed (D) -1.117 0.000 -0.233 0.571 
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.049 0.818 -0.500 0.109 
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.376 0.100 0.516 0.120 
Village (D) 0.975 0.001   
Partner (D) -3.853 0.000   
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.716 0.012   
Business owner (D) 1.972 0.000   
Prob(inheritance) 0.616 0.137   
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.177 0.406   
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.389 0.063   
Live longer than av. (D) -0.401 0.017   
Income variation  
Income development: pos. (D) -0.059 0.730   
Inc. dev.: highly volatile (D) -0.068 0.721   
Inc. dev.: slightly volatile (D) -0.144 0.359   
Variance of net income -0.001 0.241   
Constant -1.686 0.045   
Number of obs 1010
F(33, 1100 / F( 20, 661) 10.53    
Prob > F 0    
R squared 0.364    
Adj. R sq. 0.3294    
Root MSE 2.0449    
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Table 18: Regression results: local unemployment probability and saving rates 
 
  Respondent  Partner  
 Coef.  P>t Coef. P>t 
Permanent income / 10,000 0.560 0.011
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -0.483  0.099   
Age / 10 0.041  0.141 -0.006 0.868 
Age / 10 sq. -0.004  0.131 0.001 0.860 
Secondary school (D) 0.012  0.444 0.017 0.374 
Graduation diploma (D) 0.051  0.022 0.029 0.353 
University degree (D) 0.042  0.052 0.059 0.028 
Kids (D) 0.019  0.342   
Kids living in same house (D) -0.055  0.002   
Separated or divorced (D) -0.048  0.041   
Widowed (D) -0.017  0.513   
East Germany (D) -0.006  0.690   
Female (D) -0.012  0.423   
Job: blue collar (D) 0.029  0.220 0.014 0.601 
Job: civil servant (D) 0.011  0.720 -0.031 0.531 
Job: freelancer (D) 0.030  0.621 -0.023 0.769 
Job: self-employed (D) 0.109  0.003 -0.117 0.004 
Retired (D) 0.064  0.029 -0.020 0.497 
Work parttime (D) 0.002  0.927 -0.014 0.635 
Work little (D) -0.021  0.473 -0.033 0.379 
Work not (D) -0.036  0.147 -0.006 0.832 
Unemployed (D) -0.010  0.736 -0.045 0.221 
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.006  0.732 -0.003 0.882 
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.056  0.005 0.010 0.712 
Village (D) -0.006  0.806   
Partner (D) 0.011  0.904   
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.056  0.020   
Business owner (D) 0.018  0.566   
Prob(inheritance) 0.046  0.166   
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.062  0.000   
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.014  0.448   
Live longer than av. (D) 0.013  0.355   
Income risk (local unemp.rate) 0.000  0.024   
Constant -0.172  0.026   
Number of obs  1589    
uncensored obs  918    
LR chi2(68)  263.550    
Prob > chi2  0.000    
Pseudo R2  0.336    
Log likelihood  -260.606    
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Table 19: Regression results: local unemployment probability and financial 
wealth/permanent income 
 
 Respondent  Partner  
 Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
Permanent income / 10,000 13.671 0.000   
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -13.397 0.000   
Age / 10 0.516 0.059 0.726 0.060 
Age / 10 sq. -0.032 0.204 -0.065 0.086 
Secondary school (D) 0.399 0.017 -0.303 0.156 
Graduation diploma (D) 0.297 0.224 -0.078 0.820 
University degree (D) 0.191 0.403 0.094 0.753 
Kids (D) 0.156 0.448   
Kids living in same house (D) -0.735 0.000   
Separated or divorced (D) -0.332 0.155   
Widowed (D) -0.250 0.357   
East Germany (D) -0.325 0.044   
Female (D) -0.275 0.067   
Job: blue collar (D) 0.087 0.735 -0.175 0.563 
Job: civil servant (D) -0.379 0.306 -0.311 0.559 
Job: freelancer (D) -0.463 0.494 -0.884 0.293 
Job: self-employed (D) -0.633 0.116 -0.735 0.081 
Retired (D) 0.154 0.592 -0.170 0.558 
Work parttime (D) -0.286 0.369 0.013 0.969 
Work little (D) -0.346 0.259 0.137 0.733 
Work not (D) -0.331 0.205 0.045 0.878 
Unemployed (D) -0.442 0.127 -0.044 0.905 
Unemp.> 1 month (D) 0.154 0.414 -0.075 0.781 
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.588 0.005 -0.013 0.964 
Village (D) 0.106 0.687   
Partner (D) -1.898 0.050   
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.614 0.017   
Business owner (D) 0.933 0.005   
Prob(inheritance) 0.779 0.034   
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.353 0.062   
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.147 0.440   
Live longer than av. (D) -0.047 0.754   
Income risk (local unemp.rate) -0.002 0.141   
Constant -1.976 0.012   
Number of obs 1140    
uncensored obs 713    
LR chi2(68) 361.06    
Prob > chi2 0    
Pseudo R2 0.0925    
Log likelihood -1771.2515    
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Table 20: Regression results: local unemployment probability and total wealth/permanent 
income 
 
 Respondent  Partner  
 Coef.  P>t Coef. P>t 
Permanent income / 10,000 14.821  0.000   
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -15.231  0.000   
Age / 10 0.872  0.003 1.217 0.004 
Age / 10 sq. -0.053  0.055 -0.087 0.036 
Secondary school (D) 0.640  0.000 -0.119 0.620 
Graduation diploma (D) 0.605  0.020 -0.661 0.087 
University degree (D) 0.656  0.012 -0.050 0.884 
Kids (D) -0.566  0.011   
Kids living in same house (D) -0.065  0.749   
Separated or divorced (D) -0.520  0.043   
Widowed (D) -0.450  0.121   
East Germany (D) -0.453  0.010   
Female (D) -0.466  0.005   
Job: blue collar (D) 0.314  0.274 -0.531 0.115 
Job: civil servant (D) -0.064  0.880 0.204 0.741 
Job: freelancer (D) -1.055  0.153 -0.476 0.620 
Job: self-employed (D) -0.398  0.427 0.442 0.395 
Retired (D) -0.453  0.150 -0.470 0.157 
Work parttime (D) 0.343  0.327 0.234 0.554 
Work little (D) 0.750  0.025 -0.287 0.533 
Work not (D) 0.660  0.019 0.566 0.088 
Unemployed (D) -1.114  0.000 -0.296 0.467 
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.049  0.817 -0.463 0.134 
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.381  0.094 0.505 0.125 
Village (D) 1.008  0.001   
Partner (D) -4.025  0.000   
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.735  0.009   
Business owner (D) 2.027  0.000   
Prob(inheritance) 0.617  0.135   
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.152  0.475   
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.390  0.061   
Live longer than av. (D) -0.377  0.024   
Income risk (local unemp.rate) -0.002  0.144   
Constant -1.700  0.039   
Number of obs  1016
F(33, 1100 / F( 20, 661)  11.22    
Prob > F  0    
R squared  0.3626    
Adj. R sq.  0.3303    
Root MSE  2.0467    
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Table 21: Regression results: Savings motives and saving rates 
 
  Respondent Partner  
 Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
Permanent income / 10,000 0.490 0.028
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -0.436 0.137   
Age / 10 0.048 0.103 -0.017 0.665
Age / 10 sq. -0.004 0.128 0.002 0.691
Secondary school (D) 0.009 0.564 0.008 0.659
Graduation diploma (D) 0.048 0.036 0.023 0.479
University degree (D) 0.044 0.042 0.060 0.027
Kids (D) 0.003 0.907
Kids living in same house (D) -0.046 0.012
Separated or divorced (D) -0.031 0.197
Widowed (D) -0.006 0.828
East Germany (D) 0.000 0.984
Female (D) -0.006 0.697
Job: blue collar (D) 0.036 0.130 0.032 0.224
Job: civil servant (D) 0.020 0.528 -0.013 0.784
Job: freelancer (D) 0.025 0.689 0.001 0.989
Job: self-employed (D) 0.112 0.002 -0.081 0.046
Retired (D) 0.074 0.013 -0.017 0.559
Work parttime (D) 0.016 0.559 -0.005 0.868
Work little (D) -0.003 0.907 -0.0030.9 0.809
Work not (D) -0.038 0.129 -0.005 0.849
Unemployed (D) -0.003 0.921 -0.036 0.326
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.005 0.755 0.000 0.983
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.054 0.006 0.016 0.534
Village (D) -0.016 0.515
Partner (D) 0.037 0.702
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.071 0.004
Business owner (D) 0.010 0.758
Prob(inheritance) 0.054 0.104
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.058 0.000
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.012 0.527
Live longer than av. (D) 0.008 0.600
Low financial risk -0.018 0.209
High financial risk -0.019 0.581   
Saving goals (D)     
Low: buying a home 0.022 0.226   
High: buying a home 0.051 0.007
Low: unforseen events -0.103 0.000
High: unforseen events 0.020 0.146
Low: repaying debts 0.074 0.000
High: repaying debts -0.027 0.135
Low: old-age provision -0.015 0.437
High: old-age provision 0.040 0.006
Low: holidays 0.023 0.114
High: holidays -0.012 0.493
Low: major purchases -0.011 0.498
High: major purchases 0.008 0.618
Low: subsidizing offspring -0.005 0.775
High: subsidizing offspring 0.001 0.954
Low: leaving bequests -0.030 0.053
High: leaving bequests -0.007 0.735
Low: getting tax subs. -0.029 0.066
High: getting tax subs. -0.009 0.635
Constant -0.225 0.006
Number of obs  1515
LR chi2(68)  357.34
Prob > chi20 0
Pseudo R2  0.4834
Log likelihood  -190.9217   
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Table 22: Regression results: Savings motives and financial wealth/permanent income 
 
Respondent Partner
Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
Permanent income / 10,000 11.199 0.000
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -11.166 0.000
Age / 10 0.724 0.011 0.616 0.109
Age / 10 sq. -0.046 0.088 -0.053 0.166
Secondary school (D) 0.358 0.031 -0.325 0.118
Graduation diploma (D) 0.229 0.345 -0.148 0.668
University degree (D) 0.069 0.759 0.240 0.414
Kids (D) 0.100 0.643
Kids living in same house (D) -0.707 0.000
Separated or divorced (D) -0.126 0.589
Widowed (D) -0.105 0.700
East Germany (D) -0.365 0.025
Female (D) -0.265 0.076
Job: blue collar (D) -0.056 0.821 -0.015 0.959
Job: civil servant (D) -0.266 0.465 -0.254 0.610
Job: freelancer (D) -1.140 0.098 -0.713 0.385
Job: self-employed (D) -0.482 0.212 -0.432 0.294
Retired (D) 0.251 0.381 -0.236 0.408
Work parttime (D) -0.262 0.402 0.044 0.895
Work little (D) -0.145 0.634 0.251 0.528
Work not (D) -0.458 0.075 -0.040 0.890
Unemployed (D) -0.332 0.247 0.170 0.642
Unemp.> 1 month (D) 0.111 0.546 0.079 0.769
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.555 0.007 -0.091 0.755
Village (D) -0.033 0.900
Partner (D) -1.594 0.097
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.593 0.022
Business owner (D) 0.905 0.005
Prob(inheritance) 0.811 0.024
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.236 0.207
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.115 0.550
Live longer than av. (D) -0.096 0.523
Low financial risk -0.492 0.001
High financial risk -0.318 0.408
Saving goals (D)
Low: buying a home 0.272 0.155
High: buying a home 0.332 0.101
Low: unforseen events -0.676 0.002
High: unforseen events 0.177 0.221
Low: repaying debts 0.457 0.010
High: repaying debts -0.389 0.039
Low: old-age provision -0.039 0.832
High: old-age provision 0.183 0.227
Low: holidays -0.073 0.620
High: holidays -0.196 0.272
Low: major purchases -0.033 0.835
High: major purchases 0.238 0.170
Low: subsidizing offspring -0.298 0.086
High: subsidizing offspring -0.059 0.746
Low: leaving bequests -0.111 0.498
High: leaving bequests -0.331 0.120
Low: getting tax subs. -0.361 0.026
High: getting tax subs. -0.004 0.984
Constant -1.886 0.019
Number of obs 1083
LR chi2(68) 441.04
Prob > chi2 0
Pseudo R2 0.1188
Log likelihood -1636.0567
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Table 23: Regression results: Savings motives and total wealth/permanent income 
 
Respondent Partner
Coef. P>t Coef. P>t
Permanent income / 10,000 12.861 0.000
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -13.360 0.000
Age / 10 0.905 0.003 0.975 0.023
Age / 10 sq. -0.054 0.070 -0.065 0.132
Secondary school (D) 0.541 0.004 -0.060 0.801
Graduation diploma (D) 0.604 0.024 -0.238 0.554
University degree (D) 0.656 0.014 0.299 0.396
Kids (D) -0.498 0.037
Kids living in same house (D) -0.067 0.748
Separated or divorced (D) -0.286 0.279
Widowed (D) -0.388 0.194
East Germany (D) -0.368 0.041
Female (D) -0.424 0.012
Job: blue collar (D) 0.404 0.157 -0.187 0.582
Job: civil servant (D) -0.063 0.885 0.433 0.469
Job: freelancer (D) -1.235 0.111 0.229 0.812
Job: self-employed (D) -0.214 0.663 0.517 0.321
Retired (D) -0.207 0.518 -0.403 0.233
Work parttime (D) 0.431 0.223 0.439 0.271
Work little (D) 0.660 0.056 -0.189 0.684
Work not (D) 0.538 0.060 0.507 0.133
Unemployed (D) -0.819 0.006 -0.325 0.427
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.076 0.718 -0.276 0.381
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.321 0.163 0.390 0.243
Village (D) 0.868 0.005
Partner (D) -3.514 0.001
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.681 0.019
Business owner (D) 1.964 0.000
Prob(inheritance) 0.643 0.120
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.032 0.883
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.438 0.041
Live longer than av. (D) -0.387 0.024
Low financial risk -0.414 0.015
High financial risk -0.531 0.228
Saving goals (D)
Low: buying a home 0.384 0.072
High: buying a home 0.917 0.000
Low: unforseen events -0.652 0.005
High: unforseen events 0.066 0.682
Low: repaying debts 0.204 0.305
High: repaying debts 0.097 0.648
Low: old-age provision -0.202 0.321
High: old-age provision 0.144 0.398
Low: holidays 0.382 0.022
High: holidays -0.002 0.992
Low: major purchases -0.182 0.304
High: major purchases 0.341 0.090
Low: subsidizing offspring 0.225 0.252
High: subsidizing offspring -0.436 0.040
Low: leaving bequests -0.052 0.782
High: leaving bequests 0.547 0.024
Low: getting tax subs. -0.229 0.213
High: getting tax subs. -0.377 0.094
Constant -1.991 0.021
Number of obs 969
F(33, 1100 / F( 20, 661) 8.94
Prob > F 0
R squared 0.4032
Adj. R sq. 0.3581
Root MSE 2.0095
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Table 24: Regression results: All subjective variables for saving rates, relative financial 
wealth, relative total wealth 
 
 Saving rates Relative financial wealth Relative total wealth 
 Coef. P>t Coef. P > t  Coef. P>t 
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.067 0.006 0.498 0.046 0.649 0.022 
Business owner (D) 0.009 0.770 0.814 0.010 1.841 0.000 
Prob(inheritance) 0.031 0.366 0.764 0.028 0.679 0.097 
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.054 0.001 0.234 0.201 -0.017 0.938 
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.009 0.627 90.627-0 0.712 -0.328 0.127 
Live longer than av. (D) -0.004 0.797 -0.070 0.635 -0.446 0.009 
Low financial risk (D) -0.021 0.142 -0.468 0.001 -0.318 0.059 
High financial risk (D) -0.031 0.386 -0.452 0.224 -0.571 0.186 
Saving goals (D)       
Low: buying a home 0.018 0.323 0.227 0.226 0.345 0.105 
High: buying a home 0.053 0.007 0.359 0.068 0.967 0.000 
Low: unforseen events -0.094 0.000 -0.641 0.002 -0.696 0.002 
High: unforseen events 0.025 0.067 0.208 0.140 0.052 0.742 
Low: repaying debts 0.066 0.000 0.438 0.012 0.192 0.331 
High: repaying debts -0.027 0.133 -0.304 0.096 0.101 0.628 
Low: old-age provision -0.018 0.382 -0.039 0.827 -0.228 0.257 
High: old-age provision 0.034 0.019 0.112 0.448 0.073 0.664 
Low: holidays 0.026 0.078 -0.080 0.575 0.360 0.028 
High: holidays -0.008 0.670 -0.181 0.296 -0.005 0.981 
Low: major purchases -0.001 0.968 0.094 0.541 -0.093 0.595 
High: major purchases -0.001 0.967 0.223 0.189 0.306 0.123 
Low: subsidizing offspring -0.002 0.927 -0.301 0.077 0.228 0.241 
High: subsidizing offspring 0.003 0.875 -0.051 0.773 -0.467 0.025 
Low: leaving bequests -0.022 0.160 -0.019 0.907 0.010 0.958 
High: leaving bequests -0.005 0.788 -0.330 0.111 0.542 0.023 
Low: getting tax subs. -0.028 0.079 -0.307 0.052 -0.271 0.136 
High: getting tax subs. -0.013 0.483 0.007 0.970 -0.412 0.063 
Income variation       
Income development: pos. (D) 0.026 0.071 0.128 0.397 -0.083 0.633 
Inc. dev.: highly volatile (D) -0.032 0.074 -0.151 0.377 -0.066 0.728 
Inc. dev.: slightly volatile (D) -0.005 0.732 0.032 0.818 0.008 0.962 
Variance of net income 0.000 0.351 0.000 0.904 0.000 0.661 
Income risk (local unemp.rate) 0.000 0.024 -0.002 0.249 -0.001 0.649 
Low: Germany's ec. situation -0.020 0.140 0.181 0.155 0.133 0.365 
High: Germany's ec. situation 0.028 0.414 -0.001 0.999 -0.640 0.134 
Low: Own economic situation -0.093 0.000 -0.696 0.000 -0.493 0.013 
High: Own economic situation 0.024 0.138 0.162 0.309 0.384 0.037 
Low: Own health situation 0.023 0.381 -0.511 0.036 -0.405 0.125 
High: Own health situation 0.015 0.344 -0.284 0.065 -0.011 0.952 
Low: Partner's health situation -0.004 0.906 0.087 0.792 -0.119 0.749 
High: Partner's health situation -0.009 0.620 0.344 0.065 0.281 0.197 
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Figures 
Figure 4: Transformation of the wealth variable 
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Figure 5: Histograms for saving reasons 
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Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Answers are measured on a scale from 0 to 
10, where 0 means `totally unimportant' and 10 `very important'. 
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Figure 6: Histograms for development expectations 
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Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Answers are measured on a scale from 0 to 10, 
where 0 means `very negative' and 10 `very positive'. 
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